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ABSTRACT 
 
David Harvey's recent book, 'Geography, Justice and the Nature of Difference' 
(1996), engages with a central philosophical debate that continues to dominate 
human geography: the tension between the radical Marxist project of recent decades 
and the apparently disempowering relativism and 'play of difference' of postmodern 
thought. In his book, Harvey continues to argue for a revised ‘post-Marxist’ approach 
in human geography which remains based on Hegelian-Marxian principles of 
dialectical thought. This paper develops a critique of that stance, drawing on the 
work of Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. I argue that dialectical 
thinking, as well as Harvey's version of ‘post-Marxism’, has been undermined by the 
wide-ranging ‘post-‘ critique. I suggest that Harvey has failed to appreciate the full 
force of this critique and the implications it has for ‘post-Marxist’ ontology and 
epistemology. I argue that ‘post-Marxism’, along with much contemporary human 
geography, is constrained by an inflexible ontology which excessively prioritises 
space in the theory produced, and which implements inflexible concepts. Instead, 
using the insights of several ‘post-‘ writers, I contend there is a need to develop an 
ontology of ‘context’ leading to the production of ‘contextual theories’. Such theories 
utilise flexible concepts in a multi-layered understanding of ontology and 
epistemology. I compare how an approach which produces a ‘contextual theory’ 
might lead to more politically-empowering theory than 'post-Marxism’ with reference 
to one of Harvey's case studies in JNGD. 
 
I would like to acknowledge and thank Linda McDowell, Nigel Thrift, Gerry Kearns, Stuart Corbridge 
and four anonymous referees for the helpful and insightful comments made on earlier versions of this 
paper. 
 
 Dialectics & Difference 
3 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Dialectics (whether in Plato or in Hegel) is the form of thinking that attempts to 
master the effects of difference in language by playing them off in a carefully 
ordered sequence of arguments that must - by all laws of dialectical reason - lead 
up to some ultimate truth. (Norris 1987: 56) 
 
différance is the name we might give to the 'active' moving discord of different 
forces, and of differences of forces, that Nietzsche sets up against the entire 
system of metaphysical grammar, wherever this system governs culture, 
philosophy and science. (Derrida 1991: 70) 
 
And we do not have to suppose that Marx was in agreement with himself. (“What 
is certain is that I am not a Marxist,” he is supposed to have confided to Engels.) 
(Derrida 1994: 34)  
 
Human geographers appear to be more than a little nervous of the idea of 'dialectics' 
and 'dialectical reasoning'. Dialectics is one of those words which frequently comes 
up in many theoretical and philosophical debates within human geography, but which 
I think rarely receives an adequate or consistent definition. Perhaps this is not 
surprising, however, when you consider the multiple traditions from which dialectical 
discussion has evolved (see Jay 1986). Dialectical thought has a long history within 
western philosophy reaching back to the work of Plato and Aristotle (cf. Evans 1977); 
it is firmly bound into the Enlightenment project, and indeed the whole western 
rationalist history of thought (Norris 1987; Bernstein 1991). Most dialecticians appear 
to concentrate on the works of Hegel (cf. Soll 1964; Kosok 1975; Rosen 1982) and 
Marx (cf. Marx [1975]; Ollman 1971; Adorno 1973; Coletti 1975; Arthur 1984; 
Bhaskar 1993) and amongst geographers, it is particularly the works of Marx which 
have received considerable attention (cf. Harvey 1982; 1985; Gregory 1994). 
Dialectics is viewed by Harvey as the foundational philosophical underpinning of his 
work (Harvey 1996) and a key basis for developing the kind of politically-engaged 
theory which he thinks human geographers should produce. It is for this reason, that 
this paper focuses on dialectical thought and its utility (or otherwise) for human 
geographers. 
 The entry-point for my discussion is the conflict which has arisen within 
human geography as a consequence of the growing interest in postmodern theory1. 
'Postmodern theory' is a at best a loose term for a broad sweep of theoretical 
approaches (Norris 1993) whose common denominator is that they are informed by 
'post-' philosophies, mostly dominated by work which has been described as 
'poststructuralist'. In the last few years, human geography's 'postmodern' turn has 
fuelled a polarization of the subject at the sub-disciplinary level (cf. Sayer & Storper 
1997; Bridge 1997). McDowell (1994) reflects a wider concern when she suggests 
that those writing within the new social and cultural geography feel they have little 
common epistemological ground with a continuing mainstream of economic 
                                                          
1 I use the terms ‘postmodern’, ‘poststructuralist’ and the prefix ‘post-‘ in the text to differentiate 
different groups of theory. However, this is not meant to suggest any form of sharp distinction between 
categories that often overlap. Postmodern theory, if such a thing exists, spans a range of contemporary 
theory within the social sciences. Post-structuralism is used to refer to a largely continental strand of 
philosophy although some have argued that no such movement existed in any coherent sense (cf. 
Lechte 1994). The prefix ‘post-‘ attempts to represent the common threads which exist between 
various branches of poststructural thought and more recent postmodern theory.  
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geographers (see also Christopherson 1989). For example, in the 'gentrification 
debate' of the late 1980s and 1990s, the phenomena has been theorised by some using 
modernistic structural Marxist and neo-classical theories (Smith 1986; 1987; Smith et 
al 1994) whilst others have tackled the issue by focusing on the behaviour of 
individuals, consumptive acts and socio-cultural shifts more aligned with postmodern 
theorists (e.g. Warde 1991; Lyons 1996; McDowell 1997). A similar rift is 
identifiable in many aspects of the subject including debates on the activities of 
globalizing transnational corporations (cf. Dicken 1994; Amin & Thrift 1994; Castells 
1996; Hirst & Thompson 1996; Thrift & Olds 1996) or the nature of gender relations 
in the workplace (cf. McDowell & Court 1994; McDowell 1997). 
 In this context, David Harvey's latest book -  'Justice, Nature and the 
Geography of Difference' (JNGD) (1996) - is of considerable interest. Marxist 
geographical thought has been a central theme of Harvey's career and he is one of the 
leading writers within what might be called the 'post-Marxist'2 approaches. I think one 
of the central objectives of JNGD is to engage with the 'postmodern turn' and I would 
argue that it represents an attempt to bridge the growing rift between an increasingly 
postmodern human geography and Harvey's brand of ‘post-Marxism’. And it is to 
dialectical thought to which Harvey turns in order to construct his bridges. 
 In JNGD, Harvey adopts what he terms 'a dialectical and relational approach' 
to a revised Marxist 'historical-geographical materialism'. In the late 1990s he 
reiterates  his earlier view that dialectical-based thought is the best onto-
epistemological3 framework for other geographers (and social scientists) to follow. 
Harvey has long advocated and practised dialectical thought in his own work (Harvey 
1973; 1982; 1989; 1995; 1996) but in JNGD he develops these arguments further; he 
attempts what appears to produce a synthesis of dialectical thought with the ‘post-‘ 
critique (cf. Jameson 1989; Best & Kellner 1991; Barrett 1991; Lechte 1994) that has 
been levelled at Marxist and other approaches4, whilst simultaneously overcoming the 
hyper-relativist problems of postmodern thinking (cf. Callinicos 1989; Kariel 1989; 
Docherty 1990; Bauman 1993). 
 The postmodern conflict in human geography centres around two very 
different discourses5. On the one hand, the ‘post-‘ critique of modernist theories such 
as Marxism point to over-simplification and conceptual inadequacies - for example, 
the realisation that there is no singular capitalist system or that class is a narrow and 
in reality, problematic concept (Woodiwiss 1990; Graham 1992). On the other hand, 
reformulated Marxists, drawing on a widespread response from across the social 
                                                          
2 I use the term ‘post-Marxism’ here as the most appropriate. I think it conveys the continued 
adherence by Harvey and others to many aspects of a Marxian epistemology whilst also emphasising 
that contemporary Marxian theory is very different from traditional modern Marxism. 
3'I use the term 'onto-epistemological' as an umbrella concept to encompass both the 'knowledge of 
what is' (ontology) and the grounds / method by which theories concerning what is become constructed 
(epistemology). The two terms are not clearly distinct although at different points in the subsequent 
discussion I will use only one to emphasise either the metaphysical or methodological aspects of 
knowledge frameworks. 
4 The principle criticisms arise from what Lyotard (1984) terms 'incredulity towards metanarratives' 
and a social constructivist view  of theory and knowledge which is pervasive in a lot of 'post-' writing 
(see for example, the work of Foucault on power/ knowledge (e.g. Foucault 1980) and more recently 
Law  (1992; 1994) / Latour (1993) on agency.  
5 I am not suggesting that there are simply two ‘camps’, one postmodern and another ‘post-Marxist’. 
Indeed many human geographers may feel they occupy subject positions within both. However, in 
characterising the differences between ‘postmodern’ and ‘post-Marxist’, I aim to identify some of the 
core differences between these discursive frameworks. 
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sciences, respond with the argument that postmodern theories - which view 
knowledge as partial, constructed and imbued with power relations - leave no solid 
onto-epistemological ground basis around which to construct political projects and 
actions (see also Hoy 1986; Habermas 1987; Rorty 1991; Kellner 1991; McNay 1994; 
Wood 1990; 1992). In a 'post-' framework where there are only 'relative' not 'absolute' 
truths (cf. Young 1990a 1990b; Bauman 1993; Squires 1993), virtually any political 
position can be argued to be as equally justifiable as the next.  
 JNGD represents a clear continuation of the call by Harvey to appreciate the 
apparent futility of many postmodern theories.6 He argues that while we should not 
ignore many insights from 'post-' theory, ultimately geographers should still be 
concerned with the 'real' issues which affect people's lives: social justice, exclusion, 
inequitable power relationships. To do this, Harvey is still arguing that a revised 
version of his geographical-historical materialism, founded around a dialectical 
approach, is the best way to go about this project. 
 The purpose of this paper is to argue that Harvey's analysis is inadequate. In 
criticising the broad sweep of postmodern theory, I would suggest he deals in 
generalized caricatures which fail to sufficiently respond to the 'post-' critique of his 
own position.  JNGD only engages with postmodern thinking at a relatively 
superficial level, and it does not appreciate the onto-epistemological ramifications for 
Harvey's dialectical ‘post-Marxism’. The problematic of postmodern relativism does 
indeed present difficult questions concerning how to produce politically-engaged 
postmodern theory, but it does not diminish the force of the critique levelled at 
modernist epistemologies such as Marxism.  
 The central criticism I make of Harvey’s proposed dialectical ‘post-Marxism’ 
originates from the work of several poststructural philosophers: Derrida, Foucault and 
Deleuze and Guattari. My contention is that Harvey’s ‘post-Marxism’ clings 
unquestioningly to well-established, inflexible concepts, which are 'rubbed against 
each other' within a dialectical epistemology. The concepts used - capitalism or class, 
for example - have been widely criticised for their simplistic 'black box' nature (see 
Docherty 1990; White 1991; Cahoone 1996). Critiques of the multiple nature of 
capitalisms (cf. Albert 1993; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars 1994), or the difficulty 
in defining a singular class (Woodiwiss 1990; Simons & Billig 1994), or even 
defining other traditional concepts such as gender (e.g. Butler 1990; 1993; Shildrick 
1997), are now common. I develop an argument from a re-reading of these 
poststructuralists that producing new dialectical combinations of 'old' concepts, as 
Harvey does, does nothing to overcome these problems. Furthermore, I suggest that 
‘post-Marxist’ geographical theory is further resticted by its spatial ontology which 
imposes limitations by prioritising the spatial in its conception of social life. 
 However, my critique is not meant to be unnecessarily ‘anti-Marxist’. There is 
a multitude of Marx-informed thought, and there remains much within JNGD with 
which I agree. Nevertheless, I think there is an urgent need to escape the constraints 
of Harvey’s type of ‘post-Marxist’ human geography. The obvious question though, is 
‘what alternative?’ Therefore, in the latter part of the paper, I develop my 
poststructural reading to argue for an approach to ontology and epistemology which is 
much more flexible, both in the way it seeks to theorise the ‘context’ of social life and 
in the way in which concepts are produced. Such an approach leads to the production 
                                                          
6JNGD thus represents a further instalment in a now substantial debate between reformulated Marxist 
frameworks and those who argue that it has been undermined by postmodern thought. For example: 
Geras 1987, Callinicos 1989, Peet 1992, Graham 1992 and Sayer 1993.  
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of contextual theories7 which I suggest present a far more radical basis for developing 
politically-engaged and productive theory than ‘post-Marxism’.  
 
2 HARVEY AND THE PRINCIPLES OF DIALECTICS 
 
Harvey (1996) draws primarily on Marx in his synthesis of the principles of 
dialectics, although he suggests he draws 'also from those who have in recent years 
been drawn to reflect on what dialectics might mean' (ibid.: 49). In particular, he 
makes extensive use of Bertell Ollman's (1973; 1990; 1993) account of dialectical 
thinking and he is greatly influenced by recent work within the philosophy of science 
(cf. Bohm 1980; Bohm & Peat 1989; Levins & Lewonthin 1985). In JNGD, Harvey 
identifies eleven broad principles behind dialectical thinking as he sees it. I do not 
want to replicate here this eleven-fold division, as it seems a rather arbitrary partition 
of ideas which are not necessarily separate from one another. I prefer to offer a brief 
review of the key tenets of Harvey's principles which I suggest revolves around four 
main areas: process and relations; the nature of 'things' and 'systems'; the nature of 
time and space and creativity and change.  
 With regard to the first theme, process and relations, Harvey suggests that 
dialectical thinking 'emphasises the understanding of processes, flows, fluxes, and 
relations over the analysis of elements, things, structures and organized systems' 
(ibid.: 49). Thus, at an ontological level, dialectical thought suggests that 'elements, 
things, structures and systems do not exist outside of or prior to the processes, flows, 
and relations that create, sustain or undermine them.' (ibid. : 49). In this sense, Harvey 
sees dialectical thought as overcoming the problems of a static conception of things, 
elements or "permanencies", as he later calls them. 'Things are constituted out of 
flows, processes, and relations operating within bounded fields which constitute 
structured systems or wholes' (ibid.: 50). Therefore, dialectical thinking forces us to 
question by what process was every "thing" or "permanency" we encounter 
constituted. Further, he argues that 'dialectical enquiry is itself a process that produces 
permanencies such as concepts, abstractions, theories and institutionalized structures 
of knowledge which stand to be supported or undermined by continuing processes of 
enquiry' (ibid.: 55). 
 Consequently, the second main (and related) theme in Harvey's formulation of 
the principles of dialectics is a development of this understanding of 'things' and 
'systems'. He argues that 'things' and 'systems', which in positivist and empiricist 
traditions of research have been treated by many as irreducible and therefore 
unproblematic, 'are seen in dialectical thought as internally contradictory by virtue of 
the multiple processes that constitute them' (ibid.: 51). Thus, for example, individual 
sociality is built up through the capturing of certain powers which reside in social 
processes (ibid.). These powers are continuously reconstituted - the retention of 
mental capacity or symbolic skills, for example - in a perpetual process through life. 
Some of these processes will act in contradiction and be inconsistent with others. 
Thus, 'things' are always assumed 'to be internally heterogeneous at every level' 
(Levins & Lewonthin 1985: 272 cited in Harvey 1996). This has a number of 
implications.  
                                                          
7 I will argue that contextual theories share common epistemological ground with other recent 
frameworks drawing on 'post-' thought: actor-network approaches, non-representational theory (cf. 
Thrift 1996) and 'local' theory (cf. Bridge 1997; Smith 1997). 
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 Firstly, any 'thing' can be decomposed at an epistemological level into a 
collection of other 'things' which are in some relation to each other. There is no 
'basement' in this line of argument: the contention being that experience has so far 
shown that "all previously proposed undecomposable 'basic units' have so far turned 
out to be undecomposable, and the decomposition has opened up new domains for 
investigation and practice" (Levins & Lewonthin 1985: 278 cited in Harvey 1996). 
Harvey terms this 'the dialectics of deconstruction', in that all categories are capable 
of dissolution. However, Harvey's conception of deconstruction here is far removed 
from Derrida's use of the term which seeks to 'call into question the basic ideas and 
beliefs that legitimise current forms of knowledge' (Norris 1987: 14) - Derridean 
deconstruction might well question the very concept 'thing' itself which Harvey's 
approach would never do. I will return to this issue later.  
 Secondly, since all 'things' are internally heterogeneous, then the only way we 
can understand the qualitative and quantitative attributes of things is by understanding 
the processes and relations they internalise. This notion of internal relations is drawn 
primarily from Ollman (1990) but also from recent writing within an ecological 
literature (cf. Eckersley 1990; Naess 1989) which Harvey sees as framing a similar 
view (Harvey 1995). The key idea is that an individual 'cannot be understood except 
by way of the metabolic, social and other process which are internalized' (ibid.: 7). 
Thus, things are better conceived as 'events' (after Whitehead 1985) to emphasise 
their dynamism. The implication is that there can be 'no limit to this argument': there 
is no boundary to the systems of relations internalized8. Furthermore, the act of 
'setting boundaries with respect to space, time, scale and environment then becomes a 
major strategic consideration in the development of concepts, abstractions and 
theories' (ibid.: 53). 
 The third theme is the theorisation of time and space in dialectical thought. 
Harvey suggests that 'space and time are neither absolute nor external to processes but 
are contingent and contained within them' (ibid.: 53). Thus, 'there are multiple spaces 
and times (and space-times) implicated in different physical, biological and social 
processes.' (ibid.: 53). The ideas of Lefebvre (1991) are used to suggest that social 
processes produce [original emphasis] their own forms of time and space; that is to 
say that 'processes actively construct time and space' (ibid.: 53). 
 Fourthly, Harvey suggests that dialectical thinking is characterised by 
'transformative behaviour' or "creativity", arising 'out of the contradictions which 
attach both to the internalized heterogeneity of "things" and out of the more obvious 
heterogeneity present within systems' (ibid.: 54). Creative tensions are shaped in the 
oppositions which arise as parts and wholes confront each other: this is Hegelian 
'becoming' where creativity (or difference) arises out of the opposition between being 
and not-being (cf. Hegel 1967 [1821]). Harvey emphasises a key point which is seen 
as 'perhaps the most important of dialectical principles' (ibid.: 54): that 'change is 
characteristic of all systems and all aspects of systems' (Levins & Lewonthin 1985: 
275 cited in Harvey 1996); hence, 'change and instability are the norm and the 
appearance of stability of "things" or systems is what has to be explained. (ibid.: 55). 
For Harvey, this is where dialectical thought provides the greatest scope for the 
construction and / or exploration of different 'possible worlds'; it is here that there is 
the potential for the construction of new knowledges, new political identities and to 
engender social change. Of course, this necessarily means that dialectical thought 
                                                          
8In my view  the word 'internalise' here is an inadequate term for what Harvey is attempting to convey. 
There can be no clear inside to a system without a priori boundaries. 
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includes the building of 'ethical, moral and political choices (values) into its own 
process' (ibid.: 56).   
 In sum, in JNGD Harvey re-iterates and develops his career-long proposition 
that dialectical thought, in conjunction with his Marxian geographical-historical 
materialism, represents a useful basis for theory construction. In the next section, I 
will consider how Harvey attempts to reach a synthesis between this type of 
dialectical materialism and the ‘post-‘ critique in arguing, as he does, that ‘post-
Marxism’ is the best approach to radical theory construction for human geographers.  
 
3 WHY PERSIST WITH A DIALECTICAL GEOGRAPHICAL-
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM? 
 
to take inspiration from a certain spirit of Marxism… is heir to the spirit of 
Enlightenment which must not be renounced. We would distinguish this 
spirit from other spirits of Marxism, those that rivet it to the body of Marxist 
doctrine, to its supposed sytematic, metaphysical, or ontological totality 
(notably to its “dialectical method”), to its fundamental concepts of labour, 
mode of production, social class…(Derrida 1994: 88) 
 
For Harvey, dialectical thought still represents a bedrock for the application of a 
historical-geographical materialism: a framework which he has advocated in some 
form since Social Justice and the City (1973). In JNGD, it is clear that Harvey retains 
this line of thought from his earlier work. In the 1990s, he argues that dialectical 
thought is the best way to escape the postmodern 'crisis of theory' (cf. Gregory et al 
1994). However, the type of theoretical Marxian framework which Harvey develops 
in the 1990s has changed considerably from the days of Social Justice. Like most 
writing still within a Marxist epistemology (e.g. Lipietz 1988; Ruccio 1992; Resnick 
& Wolff 1987; 1997), Harvey has confronted the last decade’s substantial critique of 
more traditional forms of Marxism. The revised Marxian epistemology which he 
develops in JNGD attempts to acknowledge and respond to many of the trenchant 
criticisms of the earlier Marxist project. It does this, I would argue, in a two principle 
ways. 
 First, in JNGD Harvey develops an epistemological framework for 
contemporary dialectical materialism which is veering towards anti-essentialism. In 
so doing Harvey appears to be taking fully on board the strong criticisms levelled at 
Marxism (and other modernist epistemologies) by ‘post-’ theory. Over the last decade 
geographers and other social scientists have absorbed the arguments of ‘post-’ writers 
such as Derrida and Foucault (philosophical debates which have their heritage in 
Nietzsche and Heidegger), that our conceptions of the world do not correspond to the 
truth, but at best correspond to a partial representation, a partial truth (Foucault 1984; 
1993 [1980])). Modernist epistemologies have thus been regarded with increasing 
scepticism as to the validity of their ‘grand narratives’ (Lyotard 1984; Heller 1990; 
Smart 1992). Modern Marxism, for example, becomes one of many possible 
discursive approaches to theorizing contemporary society, and it no more corresponds 
to an absolute truth than any other discursive framework (Bauman 1993). Similarly, 
the concepts which Marx developed in Capital can no longer be regarded as some 
form of universal truth, but are reduced to partial representations within a certain 
discourse. There is no essential basis to class identity, fo example; it is not a pre-
given, cast in iron.  
 Dialectics & Difference 
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Various Marxian writers have responded to this by developing what could be 
described as an ‘anti-essentialist’ Marxism (cf. Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Resnick & 
Wolff 1987; 1989). In JNGD, Harvey implements a similar strategy by criticising the 
anti-foundationalism of postmodern theory. He criticises the extreme ‘post-’ 
argument, which regards any form of essentialist or foundationalist position as 
untenable, for slipping into a politically-vacuous relativism. ‘Post’ thought can only 
ever be marginal to politically-engaged theory because it is caught up in 'fleeing from 
the noisy, chaotic controversy of the contemporary scene' (Meyer 1952: 9), pre-
occupied with ‘an isolated self’ that ‘severs any connection between freedom and 
political commitment.' (Harvey 1996: 72). 
 Harvey argues that ‘the task of critical analysis is not, surely, to prove the 
implausibility of foundational beliefs (or truths), but to find a more plausible and 
adequate basis  for the foundational beliefs that make interpretation and political 
action meaningful, creative and possible’ (ibid.: 2). In this sense, Harvey’s position is 
seeking to shift dialectical materialism away altogether from modernist concepts of as 
something fixed and stable. Rather, he re-emphasises the long-standing dialectical 
understanding of concepts being relational in their constitution (ibid.) – thus, for 
example, class identity is seen as a fluid, relational effect emerging from the operation 
of capitalist processes. 
This brings me to the second major way in which JNGD moves towards 
incorporating ‘post’ theory: constructivism. Again philosophers such as Foucault (cf. 
Foucault 1979; 1980; 1981) and Derrida (cf. 1976; 1978a; 1981b), amongst others, 
have pointed to the all-encompassing nature of language or discourse9. At one level, a 
discourse or language can be viewed as a knowledge system which is internally 
consistent in itself; it is very hard (or even impossible) to think 'outside' discourse 
because language frameworks are all-inclusive (cf. Simons 1995). This is perhaps the 
core of what Derrida was getting at when he famously said 'there is nothing outside 
the text' (Derrida 1976: 158): in effect, if 'text' is taken to be similar to Foucault's 
notion of discourse, then there can be no exterior knowledge-position to take. To 
think absolute difference is impossible (cf. Foucault 1979; 1981). 
Harvey appears to have incorporated these insights into his reconsidered 
dialectical materialism whilst still retaining the political argument for the need to 
produce ‘meta-theory’. To use his words, he ‘accept[s] that process, flux, and flow 
should be given a certain ontological priority in the world’ (ibid.: 7) but argues that 
that is precisely the reason why we should pay so much more careful attention to… 
“permanencies” (ibid.: 8).’ Permanencies are constructed entities in this framework; 
they are all the ‘things, institutions, discourses, and even states of mind of such 
relative permanence and power that it would be foolish not to acknowledge those 
evident qualities’ (ibid.: 8). Here, I think Harvey is reconceptualising his Marxian 
epistemology in a way that allows him to acknowledge that all truths are necessarily 
partial, that Marxist concepts such as class, or the institutions of late capitalism, are 
constructed entities, produced in everyday social action and at the conceptual level 
through the relational interaction of  concepts within a certain discursive frame. It is 
in this sense that he sees dialectical thought, with its emphasis on processes and 
relations, as a powerful basis to construct ‘meta-theory’ which will form the basis for 
politically-engaged and empowering projects. 
Of course, Harvey is not alone in developing an anti-essentialist Marxist 
stance. On the contrary, such a position, although perhaps more explicitly developed 
                                                          
9For my purposes here the two terms are interchangeable. 
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in an argument for dialectical thinking by Harvey, might be considered by many 
human geographers as being more or less akin to their theoretical stance. In short, the 
idea that there is some validity and force to ‘post-’ theory, but that in order to engage 
in the ‘real world’, we need to still deal in the ‘permanencies’ of daily political. 
Indeed, a considerable literature attempts to develop this type of ‘post-Marxism’ (cf. 
Lipietz  1993; Diskin & Sandler 1993; Fraad et al 1994; Cameron 1995; Laclau 1995; 
Mouffe 1995; Gibson-Graham 1996) and move a heavily-qualified geographical-
historical materialism forward in some direction. 
I think that this is an unacceptable, and ultimately unproductive, stance to 
take. My focus is Harvey’s dialectical brand of ‘post-Marxism’ but much of my 
critique holds relevance for a wider ‘post-Marxist’ literature. The starting point for 
my opposition to Harvey’s approach is, rather paradoxically, a point of strong 
agreement with one of Harvey’s central arguments in JNGD: he complains about ‘the 
proliferation of postmodern and poststructuralist ways of thinking and writing [which] 
makes it particularly hard these days to find anything as mundane as a common 
language for expression’ (ibid.: 14). To me, this is a crucial point which few 
contemporary writers make in these ‘postmodern times’. As Harvey suggest, ‘meta-
theory’ and ‘a common theoretical language’ seem to be uncomfortably close to 
discredited modernist thought. However, if we are to escape postmodern relativism, 
then I agree with Harvey that there is a need to seriously consider how we might go 
about constructing ‘permanencies’ which can form the basis of politically-engaged 
action and theory. Where I do not agree is that a reformulated dialectical materialism 
- within a ‘post-Marxist’ epistemology - is a productive or feasible way in which to 
do this. However, before I come to expand this argument any further, it is necessary 
to first explore why Harvey places such faith in dialectical thought.  
 
Hamlet: a ‘post-Marxist’ synthesis of geographical-historical materialism and the 
‘post’ critique? 
 
In chapter twelve of JNGD, Harvey considers the case of a fire in a chicken-
processing plant in Hamlet, North Carolina in 1991, using it to explain how his 
dialectical approach produces politically-engaged theory. The wider implication from 
this discussion is the continuing class exploitation and lack of social justice available 
to many people in the contemporary global capitalist economy. Harvey argues that it 
was 'raw class politics of an exploitative sort which created a situation in which an 
accident could have the effects it did' (ibid.: 338). He suggests that the key process 
which led to the accident was the changing nature, and specifically, the decline of 
class-based politics in the United States; this left little support for any resistance to 
the Reaganite political environment of the 1980s and consequently worker rights were 
eroded in favour of capital.  
 In the US chicken-processing industry, he argues this process resulted in 
appalling safety provisions for the low-paid, mainly female, employees. The fire in 
Hamlet occurred in a factory where many died while struggling to escape from locked 
fire doors - the plant had never had a safety inspection in its eleven year history. 
Harvey argues that identity politics, drawing on postmodern theory, must shoulder 
some of the blame for this lack of political power: the weakening of US working class 
politics led to the 'increasing fragmentation of "progressive" politics around special 
issues: for example, the rise of the so-called new social movements (NSMs) focusing 
on gender, race, ethnicity, ecology, sexuality, multiculturalism, community and the 
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like' (ibid.: 341). For Harvey, this typifies the postmodernist 'death of justice': 
scepticism of 'universal truths' has 'render[ed] any application of the concept of social 
justice as problematic' (ibid.: 342). He argues that the effect of deconstruction and 
postmodern criticism has been to 'reveal how all discourses about social justice hide 
power relations' in a way that produces 'a rather simple bipolar world: 
deconstructionists... who struggle for justice, and traditional ethical and political 
theorists who are the ideologues of unjust orders' (ibid.: 343). Any concentration on 
class alone would, in this view, be seen to hide, marginalize, disempower, and 
perhaps even oppress all kinds of "others", 'precisely because it does not acknowledge 
explicitly the existence of heterogeneities and differences based on race, culture etc. 
(ibid.: 345)10.  
 The answer to this postmodern trap is his ‘post-Marxist’ materialism - a 
dialectical approach sensitive to the ‘post’ critique. In the Hamlet case, Harvey 
implements Young's (1990a; 1990b) development of a family 'of concepts and 
conditions' relevant to a contemporary conception of social justice. Young's 
theorisation is of a multi-dimensional conception of social justice which functions 
around 'five faces of oppression': exploitation, marginalization, powerless, cultural 
imperialism and violence'. Young’s work presents for Harvey a suitable non-essential 
‘meta-theory’ of social justice which is compatible with his dialectical approach. 
His prescription in the Hamlet case rests on four themes concerning the need 
to resurrect some general principles of social justice. First, Harvey identifies a need to 
'break out of the local' by utilising Young's theorisation of the multidimensional forms 
of oppression. This provides scope to 're-insert universality dialectically in relation to 
particularity, positionality and group difference' (ibid.: 350). Second, he argues that a 
deconstructionist demand to dissolve rather than respect 'any cultural or social 
categories upon which respect might be bestowed (even for a time), is just as 
damaging as assuming a historical geography of cultural achievement that is set in 
stone' (ibid.: 352); this can only lead to an inevitable failure to 'understand how places 
and cultures are constructed, sustained and dissolved' (ibid.: 352) in such a way that 
the 'fundamental dialectical question of how processes and cultural entities relate in 
place is averted. Instead, Harvey thinks a movement towards Habermas' ideal of 'a 
process-based understanding of how norms and values of justice might better become 
universalized' would be appropriate (cf. Habermas 1987), without fully adhering to 
Habermas' 'outspoken critique of postmodern particularisms'. Finally, with regard to 
the postmodern view of situated knowledge and identity, Harvey sees the problem 
with ‘post-‘ thinking as being an oscillation between two forms of thought on 
situatedness. One wing of 'post-' thought occupies a vulgar conception of situatedness 
which 'dwells almost entirely on the relevance of individual biographies' (ibid.: 354); 
this leaves it unable to 'engage with the dominant lines of political-economic power at 
work under capitalism' (ibid.: 357). Another wing of 'post-' thought, however, 'reduces 
everything to undifferentiated multiplicities and infinite flows' (ibid.: 356); this also 
encounters difficulties because 'the capacity for directed action becomes blocked by 
sheer confusion of identities' (ibid.: 357). 
 In this way, Hamlet is used in JNGD as an example of how ‘post-‘ theory is 
compatible with Harvey’s dialectical materialism. The ‘postmodern trap’ is avoided 
because Harvey reintroduces an epistemology that allows us to 'tell the difference 
between significant and non-significant others'. Thus, 'universality must be construed 
                                                          
10See Young’s (1998) review of JNGD in which she argues that Harvey is misplaced in these 
arguments about the ‘disempowering’ aspects of gender and race-based political struggles. 
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in a dialectical relation with particularity: progressive politics will therefore relate the 
universal and the particular at different scales in the drive to define social justice from 
the standpoint of the oppressed' (ibid.: 362). It is the principles of dialectics that 
provide the key creative energy to this framework, and it precisely those principles, 
which I argue, are highly problematic. 
   
The need to move beyond dialectical materialism 
 
According to Harvey, the strength of dialectical materialism is that it produces 
'creative insights' from the production of dialectical differences: he quotes Marx in 
suggesting that the best way to create new ways of thinking, to think differently, 'is to 
rub together conceptual blocks in such a way that they catch fire' (Harvey 1996: 76). 
However, I would argue that ‘post-‘ theory presents far more fundamental and 
powerful criticisms of dialectical thought, and as a consequence also ‘post-Marxism’, 
than Harvey’s analysis accounts for.  
 In his recent work responding to the ‘crisis of Marxism’ in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, Derrida makes some important points about how we should understand 
Marx and the Marxist legacy. The central argument I wish to draw from this work is 
expressed in the quotation at the beginning of this section: that Marx, Marxism and 
Marxist concepts represent a multitude of legacies and strands of thought. Derrida 
argues, rather poetically, that it is almost ridiculous to dismiss ‘Marxism’ as a whole 
and that there are countless ways in which it remains relevant. However, whilst we 
might want to retain the ‘spirit of Marx’ in many ways, especially in for example the 
urgency for radical theory, we should not think this means that Marxist doctrines, 
including dialectical thought, are also part and parcel of that. 
 In fact, I think certain ‘post-‘ theorists enable a critique of dialectical thought 
that undermines any form of ‘post-Marxism’. There are two intertwined reasons for 
this. The first relates to a wider point about dialectical thinking itself. The principles 
of dialectics rest on the assumption that productive thought and theory emerges from 
the interaction between two categories or concepts in some form of binarily-opposed 
relationship. I think this is a problematic and unnecessary assumption. A number of 
writers within the 'post-' realm of philosophy and social science have grappled with 
and problematised the issue of binary opposition (see especially Law 1992; 1994; 
Latour 1993; 1996; Serres 1982; 1995; Serres & Latour 1995). The crux of the issue 
is that there is no necessary reason why a dialectical relationship between two 
concepts 'rubbed together' is the best way to approach ontology / epistemology; 
indeed, the evidence from theorists such as Young (and see Bernstein 1983; Bhabha 
1990; Yeatman 1994; Grosz 1994; Goodman & Fisher 1995; Strathern 1996) who are 
grappling with the need to construct theories of political reality, seems to be that what 
is needed is an approach that in some way considers the multiplicity of factors 
involved in social life more effectively. I will return to this point shortly. 
 However, secondly, I would also argue that the concepts11 in circulation within 
Harvey's dialectical materialism are inadequate and potentially disempowering. In 
'postmodernizing' his Marxist approach, Harvey is still implementing familiar 
concepts - 'class', capital' and 'labour', for example - which have a long history within 
Marxist (dialectical) thought. ‘Post-Marxism’ seems to involve a dialectical 
engagement of these 'old' concepts with a selection of 'new' concepts drawn from 
                                                          
11Regarding the notion of the 'concept', I take this to refer to the basic constructions of philosophical 
thought, from which theory can be constructed (cf. Deleuze & Guattari 1994) 
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more recent social theory and ‘post-’ thought: for example, in Harvey’s adoption of 
'situatedness' (cf. Hartstock 1987; Haraway 1990; Taylor 1994) and Young's 
theorisation of social justice. The problem is that neither the older Marxist concepts 
nor the new postmodern ones are the subject of any form of onto-epistemological 
scrutiny; they are taken as 'pre-given'. Harvey adopts them in an unquestioning 
fashion, suggesting all that is needed to produce creative and politically-engaged 
theory-practice is to 'rub' combinations together in a dialectical fashion. 
  I think this is dangerous. Harvey argues for the re-insertion of some notion of 
universality amongst this eclectic array of concepts. He argues this will lead to a 
'united politics' - a politics to resist the processes of exploitation bound into the 
impoverished and unjust working conditions in the Hamlet chicken factory. But such 
an argument fails to question whether there is any feasible basis for constructing a 
political project around, in this case, class. Harvey has argued that US 'identity 
politics' in the last twenty years has emasculated class politics, but he ignores the 
issue of whether this was because class has become a problematic concept. My point 
is not whether class is or is not still useful, but that Harvey's onto-epistemology 
assumes far too much. It assumes that there is a coherent basis for 'working class' 
politics; it assumes that this concept can be epistemologically distinguished from the 
newer 'post-' issues of 'gender' and 'race'. The whole point behind much of these 
'identity politics' is that people have multiple forms of identity which position them 
differently (see, for example, Hall 1990; 1992; Gergen 1991; Chambers & Curti 1996; 
Bhabha 1993). In fact, I think the Hamlet case is just another example of this 
difficulty: uniting people around class is difficult because there is no clear class 
identity. 'The dialectical re-insertion of class' as a concept does nothing to alleviate 
this; it may be impossible to get people to unite around 'class' in Hamlet for numerous 
reasons bound into their multiple conception of identity which the 'post-' literature 
considers at length12.  
 The same problem exists for all of the concepts that Harvey employs. When  
Harvey talks of 'capitalism', what exactly is he referring to? There is an enormous 
literature pointing to the multiple and diverse nature of the 'thing' which is described 
as 'capitalism' singular (cf. Reich 1991; Thurow 1992; Albert 1993; Hutton 1995; 
Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars 1994). The nature and form of capitalism(s) in 
Hamlet, as elsewhere, needs much greater scrutiny and Harvey's approach cannot do 
that. What is needed, I think, is a form of theory that tackles the multiplicity of 
concepts which ‘post-’ theorists tell us we need to understand social life, but which 
does something more than point to the infinite array of possible concepts which might 
be used, depending on your positionality. I am all for politically-engaged theory and, 
of course, there is utility in aspects of Harvey's concepts. I just think that as they 
stand, Harvey's concepts, as well as the dialectical way in which he implements them, 
are inadequate. Some ‘post-Marxist’ writing does tackle the issue of how concepts 
might be better produced (e.g. Kaplan & Sprinker 1993; Gibson-Graham 1996), but I 
think to find a better answer to this conundrum, there is a need for a closer reading of 
poststructural philosophy. 
 
4 THINKING DIFFERENTLY: BEYOND DIALECTICS AND BINARIES 
 
                                                          
12Concerning the multiple and fluid nature of identity see, for examples, hooks (1990), Bhabha (1993) 
and Spivak (1987) on postcolonial identities and Kristeva (1987), Butler (1990),  Irigaray (1985a; 
1985b) and Probyn (1993) on gender. 
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The key question which must now be addressed is: if Harvey's dialectical use of 
established concepts is inadequate, then how can new creative, and politically-
empowering concepts be created? In this section I want to focus on the writings of 
two 'poststructural' philosophers to examine how it is possible to answer this question 
and produce new concepts for theory construction.  
 To break out of the restriction imposed by old concepts and a dialectical 
approach, we need to think creatively - I am referring to the idea of producing new 
ways of thinking which are in some way non-discursive in a Foucaultian sense. 
Within poststructural philosophy, there has been a considerable and prolonged debate 
around this issue (see Derrida 1978b; Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982; Arac 1988; Diamond 
& Quinby 1988; Boyne 1990; Still & Velody 1992; McNay 1992; 1994.). A number 
of thinkers including Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari have engaged with the 
philosophical question of what it is to 'think difference': that is what difference 
actually is, how it might be theorised, and how different concepts might be produced.  
 
Derrida, différance and the critique of dialectic 
Derrida's thought undermines Harvey's position because it calls into question the 
validity of dialectical thinking.13 Harvey's dialectics draw their inspiration from a 
number of writers in the western tradition: primarily Marx (who was heavily 
influenced by Hegel14) and more recent writing within the physical sciences. Derrida's 
critique of this tradition focuses on the Hegelian dialectical approach, but it has 
comparable force when applied to Harvey's Marxist-based approach. For Hegel, the 
history of philosophy is narrated from the viewpoint of Absolute Reason: of a 
consciousness that can now look back and retrace the progress of its own triumphal 
evolution (Hegel [1977]). This progress is marked by an increasing power of self-
reflexive understanding, so that Reason finally arrives at a point where its entire past 
history becomes ideally intelligible in the light of present knowledge. In this sense, 
Hegelian dialectics claim to speak the truth of history as well as the history of truth 
(cf. Derrida (1976 [1967]). That is to say, 'it offers not only a narrative account of 
certain stages on the path to Absolute Reason, but a metanarrative or God's-eye view 
that would finally transcend all mere relativities of place and time' (Norris 1987: 70).  
 Hegel's dialectic therefore claims to transcend all previous philosophies of 
mind and nature by showing how their various problems or antinomies are finally 
resolved through the movement of speculative thought - a movement epitomised in 
the famous Hegelian triad: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Reason proceeds by positing 
an initial idea which then turns out to have further, contradictory implications beyond 
its power to explain or control (ibid.): the 'creative fire' which Harvey adopts from 
Marx's 'rubbing together of conceptual blocks.' In Hegelian logic, the only way out of 
the logical impasse in Reason's progress is to leap to a higher, dialectical plane of 
reasoning where the old contradiction no longer applies since its terms have been 
transformed in the process. This is the Hegelian moment of Aufhebung - the 
emergence of a logic of meaning undreamt of previously (cf. Hegel 1977). The key 
point, suggests Derrida, is that Hegel insists that language bears within itself the 
power to revive past meanings and intentions. For Derrida, this means that Hegel's 
whole project rests on the presence within language of a live, self-authenticating truth 
                                                          
13In a similar vein, feminists have criticised Western philosophy and the rational tradition for its 
binarily opposed opposition of reason against unreason; this dualism is seen to anchor a whole range of 
further dualities: culture-nature; mind-body; male-female. (cf. Lloyd 1984; Whatmore 1997) 
14see Marx's critique of the Hegelian Dialectic - in Marx (1975). 
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which allows us to pass through written signs and access a knowledge of their 
animating purpose. In his work, Derrida shows that this cannot be the case: language 
does not possess such a presence of truth (see Derrida 1976 [1967]; 1982 [1972]).  
 Consequently, Derrida's argument is that Hegel's logic - his dialectical 
approach - is in fact a series of elaborate conceptual techniques for reducing whatever 
exceeds its grasp to an order of structural necessity expressed in world-historical 
terms (Norris 1987). Aufhebung, the rubbing of dialectical blocks, becomes an 
'arbitrary movement' within discourse - that is to say it only one reading among many, 
even if one which is sanctioned by all the resources of the Hegelian dialectic (ibid.). 
Thus, the implication from the Derridean critique is that 'since no logic governs, 
henceforth, the meaning of interpretation, because logic is an interpretation, Hegel's 
own interpretation can be reinterpreted - against him' (Derrida 1978b [1967]). 
 Thus, Derrida suggests there is no virtue per se in a dialectical approach. 
However, there is a further critique concerning problematic nature of Harvey's ‘post-
Marxist’ concepts. The starting point is Derrida's understanding of 'difference'. Being 
largely concerned with language, Derrida coined the neologism 'différance' to suggest 
how meaning is at once "differential" and "differed": meaning is the product of a 
restless play within language that cannot be fixed or pinned down for the purposes of 
conceptual definition. (Derrida 1991 [1981]). Modern structural linguistics is 
underpinned by the view that signs don't have a meaning in and of themselves, but by 
virtue of their occupying a distinctive place within the systematic network of contrasts 
and differences which make up any given language (Norris 1987). This situation is 
complicated, according to Derrida, by the fact that 'meaning is nowhere punctually 
present [orig. emph] in language' but that it is 'always subject to a kind of semantic 
slippage (or deferral) which prevents the sign from ever coinciding with itself in a 
moment of perfect, remainderless grasp' (ibid. : 15). Consequently, the idea behind 
the neologism is that 'différance' should function not as a static concept, not as 'a word 
whose meaning is finally booked into the present', but as 'one set of marks in a 
signifying chain which exceeds and disturbs the classical economy of language and 
representation' (ibid.: 15).  
  'Différance' is thus conceived as being the product of a 'long and meticulous 
process of argument' which cannot (and should not) be wrenched out of context for 
purposes of ad hoc definition (Norris 1987) - hence Derrida's insistence that to some 
extent it is pointless to ask what 'différance' means, unless you are willing to find out 
the hard way. In this sense 'différance' can be perhaps viewed as a concept with 'a 
non-self-identical' play of sense (Derrida 1978a [1967]), incompatible with the 
logocentric order of Western metaphysics. 'Différance' is a term constantly 'under 
erasure', deployed for tactical reasons but subject to a dislocating force which denies 
any kind of semantic or conceptual stability (see Derrida 1973 [1967]; 1991 [1982]). 
 The implication is that it is only possible to criticise existing institutions from 
within an inherited language: 'a discourse that will always have to be worked over in 
advance by traditional concepts and categories'. Derrida proposes that what is 
required is a kind of internal distancing (see Kearney 1984) - 'an effort of 
defamiliarization which prevents those concepts from settling down into routine 
habits of thought' (Norris 1987: 16). And this perhaps, is at the heart of the Derridean 
project with regard to 'différance': a recognition of the impossibility of thinking 
absolute difference which is somehow 'external' to discourse (s) but at the same time 
an attempt at producing a theoretical project which seeks to create internal distance (a 
type of rupture within discourse, if you like). The way in which Derrida seeks to do 
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this is through his technique of deconstruction: a non-self-identical process which 
'interrogates those various naive or pre-critical ideas of reference that envisage a 
straightforward matching up between language and the world outside (Derrida 1981a 
[1972]). Deconstruction must work to problematise such habits of thought by showing 
how strictly impossible it is to draw a firm line between reality and representation.  
 This is not the place to begin a lengthy review of debates concerning 
Derridean deconstruction. Rather, I wish to emphasise how much more potentially 
creative such an approach to theory is in terms of the scope for constructing new 
concepts. Harvey's dialectical materialism remains firmly within the western tradition 
of thought which Derrida criticises; it provides no scope to think outside a discourse 
of dialectically-produced concepts whose antecedents have been produced in 
historical process of binary synthesis. I have already argued that these concepts are 
inadequate, unable to cope with theorising the multiplicity of forces acting in social 
life.  
 In Harvey's words, dialectical thought is still about identifying a 'restricted 
number of very general underlying processes which simultaneously unify and 
differentiate [orig. emph.] the phenomena we see in the world around us' (Harvey 
1996: 58). This form of ontological reductionism is advocated in a very qualified 
sense: dialectical thought does not reduce to "things" but to common generative 
processes and relations' (ibid.: 58). However, if we go about a process of 
deconstructing these ontological categories then we might question whether the 
distinction between "process" and "thing" is justified. Where and why should we 
determine boundaries between, for example, the fact of the built environment of the 
city in a capitalist system and the process of capital circulation which produces that 
environment? The point here is not that this is a valid or invalid ontological 
distinction, but that the approach always establishes a binary distinction between pre-
existing concepts which embody many unacknowledged assumptions. Poststructural 
philosophy should teach us that this onto-epistemology is too stable, producing 
inflexible concepts. Instead I am arguing that we need an approach which allows the 
production of new, flexible concepts; to see how this might be done, I want to now 
look at another branch of poststructural philosophy. 
 
Deleuze, Guattari and a rhizomatic epistemology 
Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze wrote a considerable volume of philosophy 
concerned with the nature of difference, what difference means and how we might go 
about thinking of it (Deleuze 1969; 1994 [1968]; Deleuze & Guattari 1972). 
Increasingly influential within human geography (cf. Barnes 1994; Doel 1996; Katz 
1996), their ideas have considerable areas of common ground with Derrida and 
Foucault. However, I think their work has considerable, as yet unremarked, potential 
for producing new, flexible concepts which are much more enabling in the production 
of politically-engaged theory than the established, problematic concepts used by 
Harvey and other ‘post-Marxists’. I will focus on two issues: their critique of the 
dialectical tradition and their development of a rhizomatic (or as I term it), 'multi-
layered' onto-epistemology. 
 In their critique of dialectical thought, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the 
central philosophical problem in the western dialectical tradition 'consists of finding... 
the instance that is able to gauge a truth value of opposable opinions, either by 
selecting some as more wise than others or by fixing their respective share of the 
truth' (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 79). This reduces philosophy, they argue, to 
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'interminable discussion'. In this light, Hegelian dialectics makes use of 'the 
contradiction between rival opinions to extract from them suprascientific propositions 
able to move, contemplate, and communicate in themselves' (ibid.: 80). The problems 
which this tradition is that: 
 
despite the highest ambitions of the dialectic, we fall back into the most abject 
conditions...: a reduction of the concept to propositions like simple opinions; false 
preceptions and bad feelings (illusions of transcendence or of universals) 
engulfing the plane of immanence15' (ibid.: 80).  
 
This is much the same point as Derrida's: that the concepts in dialectical thought 
suffer from onto-epistemological over-confidence; in Derridean terms, dialectically-
derived concepts are imbued with 'a presence of meaning' which gives them an 
illusive quality of transcendence, of truth.16 Again, it leads to a questioning, a need to 
deconstruct the very concepts used as the ontological bases of dialectical thought. 
 However, Deleuze and Guattari adopt a rather different approach which I 
think has greater potential for the developing an epistemology of flexible concepts 
than Derrida’s work. In the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Anti-
Oedipus (1973) and A Thousand Plateaus (1982), they develop what they term a 
'schizo-analytic enterprise', specifically characterised by a non-bounded disciplinary 
and theoretical approach. This is characterized by the idea of the rhizome, developed 
throughout their work. The rhizome represents 
 
a multiplicity that cannot be understood in terms of the traditional problems of the 
One and the Many, of origins and genesis, or of deep structures, in which any point 
can be connected to any other point, and any sequence of elements can be broken at 
any juncture. (Bogue 1989.: 125) 
 
In other words, the rhizome is a notion which incorporates inherent flexibility in 
thought (cf. Massumi 1996): it allows the multiple combination and re-combination of 
elements in a creative and flexible fashion which constantly reinforces what Derrida 
might call 'the play of difference' (Derrida 1978a). Deleuze and Guattari implement 
the rhizome in their ontology / epistemology in a way which enables them to tackle 
the sticky issue of multiplicity. For example, Bogue (1989) argues that each of the 
fifteen chapters of A Thousand Plateaus' represents itself 'a plateau, a plane of 
consistency, or level of intensity which traverses any number of traditional 
disciplinary domains and levels of analysis' (ibid.: 125). Each of these 'plateau' has its 
own themes and concepts which are interrelated with those of other plateaux and 
which appear in other plateaus, but which 'are not finally reducible to any abstract 
system or "plateau of plateaus" ' (ibid.: 125). In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari 
maintain a consistent element of flexibility and creativity in their work: the concepts 
they develop are rhizomatic in that they are composed of several elements 
                                                          
15A 'plane of immanence' in the writing of Deleuze / Guattari is an abstract concept designed to express 
the existence of thoughts or things in a non-transcendental fashion. It is defined therefore as 'an 
absolute level at which things are grasped according to the immanent relations that constitute them' 
(after Goodchild 1996 ). 
16Deleuze's philosophy also engages with Hegelian dialectics in its discussion of Bergson's conception 
of duration. For a discussion of Deleuze / Bergson see Deleuze (1988a [1966]) and also in relation to 
Hegel and dialectics, see Butler (1987); Game (1991). 
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simultaneously, and they are flexible in that there is always scope for their 
reconfiguration along different lines. 
 Deleuze and Guattari's approach is one where multiple concepts which are  
rigorously delineated and closely interrelated form 'loose resonating aggregates rather 
than finite structures'. The principle of formation of these aggregates is thus strictly 
additive and open-ended (Bogue 1989). The value of this loose aggregation has been 
asserted by Cindi Katz (1995; 1996) in her discussion of 'minor theory'. Katz picks up 
on this aspect of Deleuze and Guattari's work in arguing that we need to cause 
ruptures within major theory by deploying minor theories. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
the 'minor' is the key to subversion, escape or discursive transformation; Katz 
suggests it is a form of 'becoming' where the minor reworks the major from within - in 
Foucaultian terminology this might to be described as rupturing discourse from 
within. 
 However it is expressed, the flexibility of the Deleuzo-Guattarian approach to 
ontology / epistemology is the key point. As Katz points out, Deleuze and Guattari 
present a basis through which to produce politically-engaged theory which 
appreciates the multiplicity and instability of the concepts we need to understand 
social life: 'gender is not class and class is not race; and the maps of their politics are 
not homologous. Yet we are lost... if we think they are separate worlds. (Katz 1996: 
495)'. And this is the crux of my argument for abandoning the type of ‘post-Marxism’ 
used by Harvey: what is needed is a framework which avoids the binary trap of 
dialectics, and which provides the ability to produce flexible concepts. In the 
remainder of this paper, I will briefly sketch one possible framework around which 
this might be done.  
 
5 CONTEXTUAL THEORY: RECONSIDERING THE CASE OF 
HAMLET 
 
The question now is how can ‘post-‘ theory produce something I agree with Harvey is 
crucial: ‘a common language for expression’ (Harvey 1996: 14)? I concur with 
Harvey’s argument that there is a need for some form of ‘meta-theory’ if politically-
engaged theory is to be produced, but I do not think the answer lies with ‘post-
Marxism’ for the reasons I have outlined. Instead I will argue for a ‘meta-theory’ 
informed by ‘post-‘ writing which takes the need for a multi-layered onto-
epistemology and flexible concepts seriously. The key to this lies in an ontology of 
context. 
 
(i) The need for 'contextual theory' 
Contemporary human geography has become highly concerned with place (e.g. Keith 
& Pile 1993; Smith 1993; Duncan & Ley 1993; McDowell 1997) as the site of 
analysis. It is in ‘place’ that social interaction and activity occurs in space-time, and 
as such place has become increasingly understood as the location of political struggle 
and the arena for a ‘spatialized politics’ (Keith & Pile 1993). Thus, geographers are 
already centrally concerned with what many people would take as a synonym for 
‘context.’ 
 However, I think ‘context’ should be understood as something more than 
place. My argument is that  human geography exhibits a problematic epistemological 
fetishization of space. In the last fifteen years or so, ‘space’ has become a fashionably 
concept within social theory (cf. Jameson, Berger, Foucault). Geographers have 
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joined this vogue for reintroducing space into social theory where it has previously 
been neglected (for example, Soja’s (1996) recent development of Bhabha’s (1993) 
Thirdspace concept) However, Massey (1993) makes an important point: she finds 
recent conceptualizations of ‘space’ and the ‘spatial’ problematic, contested and 
unclear (Massey 1993: 141). Massey goes on to complain that the effect of this 
confusion is ‘to effectively depoliticise the realm of the spatial’ (ibid.: 142). Whilst 
for some, a place-based politics is the answer to this problem, I do not think that a 
reliance on the concept of place is sufficient. ‘Place’ implicitly emphasises the spatial 
aspects of social life which I would argue is as conceptually and theoretically 
restrictive as ‘post-Marxist’ usages of class, capital or gender. What is needed is a 
form of ontology / epistemology which is designed to  tackle the complexity of social 
life, as opposed 'to riding roughshod over ambiguity and polarising complexity' 
(Thrift 1998). What is needed is an ontology / epistemology which allows us to 
produce a flexible theorisation of context. Two recent literatures in particular within 
geography represent a move in this direction. 
First, actor-network theory (ANT) (cf. Pile 1993; Law 1994; Pile & Thrift  
1995; Bingham 1997; Leyshon & Pollard 1997) exhibits some of the features of what 
we could call a multi-layered epistemology. The actor-network approach sees social 
agency as a 'precarious achievement' with agency understood through the metaphor of 
the network (Law 1994). Agency is seen as being continually (re)constructed through 
multiple, competing processes of ordering which generate 'effects' - in terms of what 
we are concerned about here, ANT provides ways of understanding, for example, 
class action as a constructed, contingent and most importantly, multiple effect. 
Politicised class action would be seen as the outcome of a process of ordering which 
could span numerous conceptual fields (gender, historical factors, race) as viewed in 
Harvey's approach. 
 The second literature considers 'non-representational theory' (cf. Thrift 
1996a). Thrift more specifically makes reference to the issue of context, viewing it as 
'a necessary constitutive element of interaction' (ibid.: 3). He argues for what he terms 
'modest theory'; this is theory 'with a lighter touch'  which focuses on social practice 
in a way that 'stresses the radical incompleteness and contextuality found in 
poststructural thought' but which also 'stresses the limits and boundaries to that kind 
of thought' (ibid.: 31). Context is central to this approach but it is not seen as a 
synonym for 'place'. Rather, Thrift suggests context should be understood as 'a 
performative social situation, a plural event which is more or less spatially extensive 
and temporally specific.'  
 This is a crucial point. Context is not just about space or place; it needs to be 
understood as incorporating at least three ontological 'fields': space, time and social 
practice. This ontological basis for the production of theory sensitive to this - 
contextual theory17- has a number of broad arguments. First, context needs to be 
understood in such as way that no specific ontological field is necessarily prioritised. 
Context should not be understood through the lenses of space or place, universal or 
particular. Actor-network theory does at least illustrate how agency spans all these 
ontological fields but it seems far too narrow to try and theorise agency which focuses 
                                                          
17 The onto-epistemological stance I outline is not intended to represent the basis for a new, singular 
meta-theory in the way that Harvey argues dialectical materialism is the epistemological paradigm 
which should be adopted.. There is no one ‘contextual theory’. Rather different contextual theories are 
produced according to the requirements of a specific context for the production of knowledge. 
Likewise the concepts used are themselves flexible, and produced in the act of constructing theory, as 
opposed to being ‘brought to’ a context to allow us to theorise it.  
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on any one. Unfortunately, ANT is limited in this way as its epistemology is 
dominated by the spatial metaphor of the network. Instead, contextual theory is about 
deploying concepts in an intersecting fashion - in a way which places no necessary 
emphasis on framing theory around one particular ontological field. Context is 
simultaneously spatial, temporal and social, and therefore I would argue all three need 
to be co-present in theory which tackles complexity effectively 
 Second, the difficulty with non-representational and actor-network approaches 
is that the theory produced retains the sense of 'radical incompleteness' which Thrift 
refers to. That is fine for academics versed in such debates, but remains ambiguous 
for politicians and policy-makers. Surely in seeking to produce politically-engaged 
theory, there is a need to set clear theoretical frameworks upon which people can act? 
I would suggest the answer to this issue is implement an onto-epistemology which 
formalizes the inherent flexibility of the concepts being created. If, as Katz points out, 
class, race and gender are inseparable, yet their political configurations differ 
depending on the issue, then there is a need for new understandings of the class-race-
gender intersection; this is the flexible basis for the new concepts of contextual 
theory. The idea of a class-race-gender intersection is not a fully developed concept in 
itself because it is abstracted from context; there are many possible creative 
formations which could be derived through this epistemological construct. The 
important point is that there is a flexible (and multiple, rhizomatic) element to the 
concepts developed in contextual theories which enable them to be transferable 
without being rigidly defined in the way Harvey's concepts are. 
 
(ii) Reconsidering the case of Hamlet 
The argument for producing contextual theories is better elaborated through an 
exploration as to how such an approach would be implemented in Harvey's Hamlet 
case study. 
 Obviously, in beginning to re-think Hamlet there has to be the recognition that 
I bring to the analysis a range of value judgements - in this case concerning social 
justice; there is, of course, no escaping this as all forms of knowledge are positioned 
and situated (cf. Haraway 1988; Whatmore 1997). However, assuming I bring to the 
case study similar judgements about social justice as Harvey - that I want to examine 
the possibility of empowering the workers in the US chicken processing industry - 
then the implementation of a contextual approach is rather different to a ‘post-
Marxist’ one. The first phase both assesses the relevance of existing concepts and 
thinks creatively about the utility of new conceptual configurations. Thus, the 
common 'gender' experience of the female chicken factory workers might be one of 
several starting points. However, a contextual approach then scrutinises the axes of 
how gender intersects with other concepts.  
 Given that I regard the position of the women workers as disempowered, these 
conceptual intersections allow me to explore the nature of inequitable power relations 
across different 'ontological fields' simultaneously. For example, given the historical 
context of chicken farming in the Hamlet region, its relationship with the culture of 
organizational practice in the Chicken factories, and also national and regional legal 
conditions, it is possible to develop a multi-layered theorisation of the potential for 
political organization and / or policy initiatives which specify gender as a point of 
empowerment. Although gender is the conceptual point of entry, it is not prioritised in 
isolation in the concomitant process of theory construction, but rather used in its 
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intersections with other relevant groups of concepts (e.g. scales, historical factors, 
cultural attributes). 
 Harvey's analysis of Hamlet is trapped because it cannot de-prioritise key 'old' 
concepts: the central problematic for Harvey is the unfeasible nature of class-based 
political action. Whilst the working conditions of women on the factory floor may 
lend itself to political organization, the local, regional and national political 
institutions in that part of the US would perhaps be hostile to such union-style 
organization. Harvey recognises this, but has little in the way of theory about how to 
overcome the problem.  Contextual theories represent a formalized and ordered way 
of arriving at / presenting arguments for a political movement which spans multiple 
time and spatial scales, as well as different aspects of social practice. Worker 
organizations might be better advised to try to force the regulation and surveillance of 
safety regulations by incorporating sympathetic managers, local politicians, local and 
national media into their project. Once within this multi-layered framework, it is then 
possible to develop further an assessment of the project's feasibility - for example, 
considering the likely reception of such an approach amongst differing chicken 
factory organizational cultures, amongst manager attitudes, values and cultures in the 
industry  or the viability of incorporating national media. 
 This may appear to be a development of some of the suggestions which come 
from Harvey's ‘post-Marxist’ analysis. However, my point is that Harvey's approach 
can never get this far: the dialectical opposition of ill-scrutinised concepts leaves a 
gaping disjuncture between how ‘post-Marxist’ theory presents the world, and many 
of Harvey's sensible and politically-empowering recommendations. More importantly, 
many conceptual avenues are left unexplored because the ‘post-Marxist’ 
epistemology is too narrow, prioritising one ontological field at a time in the 
dialectical play of concepts.  In this sense, Harvey's suggestions for political 
engagement appear to occur haphazardly, arising in ambiguity from theory which 
often bears no relation to the onto-epistemology. Harvey makes observations and 
recommendations about Hamlet which have no secure epistemological basis because 
dialectical thought cannot furnish him with adequate (flexible) concepts. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
The title of this paper suggests that it is ‘against’ Harvey’s form of ‘post-Marxism’. 
And yet this is not wholly true. Derrida (1994) argues that his deconstructive 
approach has never been Marxist, but that equally it has never been non-Marxist. The 
distinction is subtle, but important. Deconstruction remains faithful to at least one of  
Marxism’s spirits – at least to one because ‘there is more than one of them and they 
are heterogeneous’ (ibid: 71). Contemporary theory is inextricably bound into the 
legacy of Marxism and there remain certain aspects of that which are important. 
However, there are equally many elements which subsequent arguments have 
undermined. The aim of this paper has been to argue that one spirit of Marxism – in 
the form of dialectical materialism - is not the most effective way of producing 
politically engaged theory. At the same time, the very notion of a radical politically-
engaged theory owes a great deal to another spirit of Marxism.  
 Thus, I think these two Marxist ‘spirits’ are in conflict in the dialectical ‘post-
Marxism’ espoused in JNGD. Radical political theory can not be produced, I have 
argued, through the unproblematised ontology / epistemology which Harvey adheres 
to. Consequently, in concluding, I cannot emphasise enough my opposition to 
Harvey’s dismissal of ‘post-‘ thought as a ‘hyper-relativist’ fantasy. Unfortunately, 
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David Harvey’s own positionality within the discipline means that such words are 
taken very seriously. Harvey’s sentiments serve to reinforce the widespread 
reluctance to think beyond traditional approaches to social science, such as Marxism, 
even though they appear to have been undermined by the 'post-' critique. Thus, it is 
important to counter these restrictive arguments. I have argued at length that Harvey 
offers a scant reading of the ‘post-‘ critique – a literature which in fact exposes ‘post-
Marxist’ doctrine to fatal onto-epistemological flaws. Harvey’s attempt in JNGD to 
synthesise Marxian epistemology with ‘post-‘ theory is misconstrued in that it fails to 
tackle the key ontological problematics of inflexible concepts and a dialectical way of 
thinking which operates within a restrictive binary frame.   
In short, if the production of knowledge and theory is about producing 
understandings of the web of complexity which is social life, as well as political-
action prescriptions, then there are very strong arguments to suggest that dialectical 
thought and ‘post-Marxism’ are not sufficient to meet the challenge. Consequently, 
the final sections have sought to explore an alternative ‘meta-framework’ for onto-
epistemology by advocating the development of contextual theories where the 
concepts used incorporate formalized flexibility: they incorporate abstract aspects 
which are transferable, but these 'mobile' elements are not the total concepts. Rather, 
concepts only become fully developed in their implementation in specific contexts. 
And most significantly, contextual theories do not prioritise any ontological field in 
this process of theory construction: context is simultaneously spatial, temporal and 
social.  
  Overall, the goal of Harvey's ‘post-Marxist’ stance is to retain the political 
engagement of the Marxist human geography of the 1970s and 1980s. As Corbridge 
(1998) states in his review of JNGD, 'it matters that we don't lose sight of the 
appalling and shared poverty that faces so many people in the world today'. Yet 
Harvey is right to resist 'surrendering  to the politics only of Difference' and 'the 
tyranny of the text' (ibid. : 15). I agree entirely with the former statement but not with 
the latter; this represents only retrenchment. There are serious flaws with any form of 
‘post-Marxist’ onto-epistemology - flaws which I see as fatal to that framework  And 
in that sense Marxism can only become ever less radical and politically-empowering 
as its theoretical arguments become ever more remote from social realities. Human 
geographers need to get over their reservations, grit their teeth, and abandon the type 
of  ‘post-Marxism’ Harvey prescribes. Only then can they get on with the important 
task of reconstructing politically-empowering theories from postmodern thought, 
which suggests, to end by returning to Derrida’s (1994) thoughts on Marx, that whilst 
I am against Harvey’s dialectical materialism, I am wholly for this other ‘spirit of 
Marx’ to which we owe the very idea of radicalism itself. And one way of rekindling 
that radical spirit might be through the development of what I have termed contextual 
theories. 
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